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!!! Overview
[{$pagename}] ([ZKP] or zero-knowledge [protocol]) is a method by which the [prover] ([Peggy]) must prove to the [verifier] ([Victor]) that a given statement is true, without conveying any information apart from the fact that the statement is indeed true.[1][{$pagename}], informally, is an interactive proof [protocol] that provides [__highly convincing evidence__|Level Of Assurance] that a statement is true or that [Prover] has certain knowledge (of a secret) and that [Prover] knows a (standard) proof of it while providing __not a single bit of information__ about the proof (knowledge or secret). (In particular, [Verifier] who got convinced about the correctness of a statement cannot convince the third person about that.)
More formally A [{$pagename}] of a theorem T is an interactive two party protocol, in which [Prover] is able to convince [Verifier] who follows the same protocol, by the __overwhelming statistical evidence__, that T is true, if T is indeed true, but no [Prover] is not able to convince [Verifier] that T is true, if this is not so. In additions, during interactions, [Prover] does not reveal to [Verifier] any other information, except whether T is true or not. Consequently, whatever Verifier can do after he gets convinced, he can do just believing that T is true.
Similar arguments hold for the case [Prover] possesses a secret.If proving the statement requires knowledge of some secret information on the part of the [prover], the definition implies that the [verifier] will not be able to prove the statement in turn to anyone else, since the [verifier] does not possess the secret information. Notice that the statement being proved must include the [assertion] that the [prover] has such knowledge (otherwise, the statement would not be proved in zero-knowledge, since at the end of the protocol the [verifier] would gain the additional information that the [prover] has knowledge of the required secret information). If the statement consists only of the fact that the [prover] possesses the secret information, it is a special case known as [{$pagename}] of knowledge, and it nicely illustrates the essence of the notion of [{$pagename}]: proving that one has knowledge of certain information is trivial if one is allowed to simply reveal that information; the challenge is proving that one has such knowledge without revealing the secret information or anything else.
For [{$pagename}]s of knowledge, the [protocol] must necessarily require interactive input from the [verifier], usually in the form of a challenge or challenges such that the responses from the prover will convince the [verifier] if and only if the statement is true (i.e., if the [prover] does have the claimed knowledge). This is clearly the case, since otherwise the [verifier] could record the execution of the protocol and replay it to someone else: if this were accepted by the new party as proof that the replaying party knows the secret information, then the new party's acceptance is either justified – the replayer does know the secret information – which means that the [protocol] leaks knowledge and is not zero-knowledge, or it is spurious – i.e. leads to a party accepting someone's proof of knowledge who does not actually possess it.
Some forms of non-interactive [{$pagename}]s of knowledge exist, but the validity of the proof relies on computational assumptions (typically the assumptions of an ideal [cryptographic Hash Function]).
!! More Information
There might be more information for this subject on one of the following:
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* [#1] - [Zero-knowledge_proof|Wikipedia:Zero-knowledge_proof|target='_blank'] - based on information obtained 2015-12-23