Unlike TLS client certificates, the use of Token Binding keys does not require any interaction with the user. This is because:[1]
The Proof-of-Possession involves signing the exported keying material RFC 5705 for the TLS connection with the Private Key. The corresponding Public Key is included in the Token Binding ID structure (described in the "Token Binding ID Format" section of this RFC 8471). Token Bindings are long-lived, i.e. they encompass multiple TLS connections and TLS sessions between a given client and server. To protect privacy, Token Binding IDs are NEVER transmitted in Cleartext and can be reset by the user at any time, e.g. when clearing browser cookies.
When issuing a Security Token to a client that supports Token Binding Protocol, a server includes the client's Token Binding ID in the token. Later on, when a client presents a security token containing a Token Binding ID, the server makes sure the ID in the token matches the ID of the Token Binding established with the client. In the case of a mismatch, the server discards the token.
Servers generate various Security Tokens (e.g. HTTP cookies, OAuth tokens) for applications to access Protected Resources. Any party in possession of such token gains access to the Protected Resources. Attackers export Bearer Tokens from the user's machine, present them to the servers, and impersonate authenticated users. The idea of Token Binding Protocol is to prevent such attacks by cryptographically binding Security Tokens to the TLS layer.
In order to successfully export and Replay attack a bound security token, the attacker needs to also be able to export the client's Private Key, which is hard to do in the case of the key generated in a secure hardware module.